Protect a Go API

This quickstart protects a Go net/http API with KeenAuth access tokens. You add the protect middleware of the Go SDK, require a scope on one route and test the API offline with the SDK test kit. The middleware uses the standard library only and works with any router that accepts an http.Handler.

The API has three endpoints:

Endpoint Requires
GET /api/public nothing
GET /api/private a valid access token for your API
GET /api/messages a valid access token with the messages:read scope

Before you begin

1. Install the SDK

go get github.com/keenauth/keenauth-go

The SDK is not published yet. Until it is, the example builds against the SDK source with a replace directive in go.mod.

2. Configure

The API reads its configuration from environment variables only:

Variable Required Meaning
KEENAUTH_ISSUER yes Your environment's issuer
KEENAUTH_AUDIENCE yes Your API's identifier
PUBLIC_BASE_URL yes The URL clients call (see Behind a proxy)
KEENAUTH_WEBHOOK_SECRET recommended The idp_whsec_ signing secret of the webhook endpoint that delivers token.revoked (two, comma separated, while you rotate it). Without it the API never learns of revoked tokens
ADDR no Listen address, default :8080

3. Protect your routes

NewHandler creates the middleware and the routes. m.Handler requires a valid token; m.Require also requires scopes. The handler reads the verified claims with protect.ClaimsFrom.

// NewHandler builds the API. The verifier is a parameter so that tests can pass the offline test kit's verifier;
// main passes a real one. The revocation cache is fed from the token.revoked webhook.
func NewHandler(v protect.AccessTokenVerifier, publicBaseURL string, revocation protect.RevocationChecker) (http.Handler, error) {
	m, err := protect.New(v, protect.Options{
		PublicBaseURL: publicBaseURL,
		Revocation:    revocation,
		OnError: func(r *http.Request, err error) {
			// The error never contains the token or claim values; never log the Authorization or DPoP header.
			log.Printf("rejected %s %s: %v", r.Method, r.URL.Path, err)
		},
	})
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	mux := http.NewServeMux()
	// No token needed.
	mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/public", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
		writeJSON(w, map[string]string{"message": "Hello from a public endpoint."})
	})
	// Any valid access token for this API.
	mux.Handle("GET /api/private", m.Handler(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		claims, _ := protect.ClaimsFrom(r.Context())
		writeJSON(w, map[string]string{"message": "Hello from a private endpoint.", "sub": claims.Subject})
	})))
	// A valid access token that also carries the messages:read scope.
	mux.Handle("GET /api/messages", m.Require(protect.Requirement{Scopes: []string{"messages:read"}})(
		http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
			writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"messages": []string{"Hello from a scoped endpoint."}})
		})))
	return mux, nil
}

main builds the real verifier from the configuration. The verifier fetches the signing keys from your environment the first time it sees a token.

func main() {
	cfg, err := ConfigFromEnv(os.Getenv)
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}
	// verify.New refuses an issuer under the reserved .invalid domain, so a test token can never pass here.
	v, err := verify.New(verify.Config{Issuer: cfg.Issuer, Audience: cfg.Audience})
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}
	revocation := protect.NewMemoryRevocationCache(0, nil)
	api, err := NewHandler(v, cfg.PublicBaseURL, revocation)
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}
	h := api
	if len(cfg.WebhookSecrets) > 0 {
		wv, err := webhook.NewVerifier(cfg.WebhookSecrets) // the error never contains the secret
		if err != nil {
			log.Fatalf("KEENAUTH_WEBHOOK_SECRET: %v", err)
		}
		h = WithWebhook(api, NewWebhookHandler(wv, revocation, nil))
	} else {
		log.Print("KEENAUTH_WEBHOOK_SECRET is not set: token.revoked events are not received, so revoked tokens stay valid until they expire")
	}
	srv := &http.Server{Addr: cfg.Addr, Handler: h, ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second}
	log.Printf("listening on %s", cfg.Addr)
	log.Fatal(srv.ListenAndServe())
}

4. Run and call the API

export KEENAUTH_ISSUER=https://your-environment.eu.keenauth.app
export KEENAUTH_AUDIENCE=https://api.example.com
export PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://api.example.com
go run .

For a first call, get a token with the client credentials grant of a machine-to-machine application that has the messages:read scope on your API:

ACCESS_TOKEN=$(curl -s -u "$CLIENT_ID:$CLIENT_SECRET" \
  -d grant_type=client_credentials \
  -d resource=https://api.example.com \
  -d scope=messages:read \
  https://your-environment.eu.keenauth.app/oauth2/token | jq -r .access_token)

curl -i http://localhost:8080/api/messages -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN"

5. Test without a network

The test kit package keenauthtest mints tokens signed with a public test key and builds a verifier that accepts only those tokens. The tests pass that verifier to NewHandler, so they need no network and no KeenAuth account. See Offline test kit.

func newTestAPI(t *testing.T) (http.Handler, *protect.MemoryRevocationCache) {
	t.Helper()
	v, err := keenauthtest.NewVerifier(verify.Config{Audience: audience})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	cache := protect.NewMemoryRevocationCache(0, nil)
	h, err := NewHandler(v, baseURL, cache)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	return h, cache
}
go test ./...

The example's tests check that a valid token is accepted and that a missing, expired or wrong-audience token, a missing scope, a token in the URL query and a revoked token are rejected with the statuses below. They also send a DPoP-bound token with a proof for PUBLIC_BASE_URL. The tests also send signed token.revoked deliveries: a valid one revokes the token, a forged, tampered or stale one gets 400 and revokes nothing, and a repeated one has one effect.

Responses

Request Status code in the body
No Authorization header 401 missing_token
Expired token, token for another API, bad signature, revoked token 401 invalid_token
Token without the required scope 403 insufficient_scope
Token in the URL query (?access_token=) 400 invalid_request

The body is application/problem+json and the WWW-Authenticate header carries the standard challenge. The full table is in Protecting your API with middleware.

Behind a proxy

If clients use DPoP, the middleware checks that each proof was made for the URL the client called. Set PUBLIC_BASE_URL to the external URL clients call, for example https://api.example.com, also behind a proxy or load balancer. It is required and must use https (http only for localhost, 127.0.0.1 or [::1]); the app refuses to start without it. The middleware never trusts X-Forwarded-* headers.

Revoked tokens

An access token stays valid until it expires, so KeenAuth tells your API when tokens are revoked. The example passes an in-memory revocation cache to the middleware and serves a token.revoked webhook at POST /webhooks/keenauth (main.go, webhook.go) that feeds it.

  1. In the dashboard, create a webhook endpoint with the URL https://<your host>/webhooks/keenauth that subscribes to token.revoked, and export its signing secret as KEENAUTH_WEBHOOK_SECRET.
  2. The handler verifies the signature with the SDK on the raw body and answers 400 when it is invalid or the timestamp is more than five minutes off. It maps the event's selector (access_token, session, user, client, org, org_user, client_user) to a revocation marker and answers 204; the middleware then rejects every matching token issued before not_before.
  3. KeenAuth delivers at least once, so the handler applies each webhook-id once. If the marker cannot be stored it answers 503 and KeenAuth delivers the event again. It ignores other event types and selectors that no access token can match (refresh_family, api).

The handler logs the event id, the selector type and the reason, never the body, a signature or the secret. Each process has its own cache; with several instances, put the markers in a shared store behind the same Revoke method. See Revocation cache.

Next steps